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13 January 1965

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTRIES ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY LIST

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
Office of Current Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
13 January 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Developments in Countries on the  
Counterinsurgency List

1. Sudan

The Sudan's "southern problem" still appears insoluble for the foreseeable future. Northern and southern leaders are now deadlocked on the question of arranging talks to determine the future status of the three southern Negroid provinces. The southern leaders refuse to return from exile to the Sudan, but the central government insists that any talks take place in Khartoum. The predominantly Arab central government still refuses to consider the possibility of either federation or separation for the south. The regime seems to be trying to bypass leaders of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), which commands the loyalty of most southerners, and plans to negotiate with a former SANU leader who has already been thoroughly discredited, in southern eyes, as a northern stooge.

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Parliamentary elections are still scheduled for March or April, although failure to settle the southern problem may force some postponement. The various political parties are continuing to maneuver to broaden their respective popular followings. The Communists are now pushing hard, although thus far unsuccessfully, for establishment of special constituencies of workers and tenants to ensure that they win a substantial bloc in the new parliament. If the elections take place as scheduled, it now appears that the loose coalition of the influential Ansar with the urban National Union Party will probably come out with a majority, although the Communists can be expected to make a strong showing.

## 2. Iraq

The deadlock between the Iraqi Government and the Kurds in northern Iraq continues. Sporadic negotiations between the two sides go on, and the government has apparently offered several concessions, including integration of a number of the forces of Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani into army units in the north. However, the Kurds are unlikely to believe that the government is bargaining in good faith.

Occasional clashes between the two sides continue to occur from time to time. The government recently conducted a large-scale punitive attack against Kurdish forces in the Khanaqin area in extreme southeastern Kurdistan. The Kurds replied by shooting up an army convoy. However, the government has made no major move to beef up its depleted forces in Kurdistan, and broader scale hostilities are probably not imminent.

Unless a breakthrough occurs in the negotiations, fighting is very likely to resume sometime in the spring. Barzani retains control of much of Kurdistan outside the major population centers,

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### 3. Laos

The military situation remains relatively quiet in Laos, with significant activity limited to the area east of Savannakhet where rightist forces are pressing clearing operations. The Laotian Air Force is also continuing to mount strikes against Communist positions in central and southern Laos, with particular emphasis on attacks against supply routes and facilities.

The Communists are continuing to build up their forces in south-central Laos. During the past few weeks, there have been reports of substantial troop movements into Laos from North Vietnam, deploying south along the recently-opened Route 23 toward the Muong Phine - Tchepone area. Although the bulk of these forces probably is slated for service in south Laos, there are indications that some elements may be moving into position for infiltration into South Vietnam.

In addition to the large numbers of troops sighted moving toward south Laos, troops have been observed moving west along Route 12 toward the Nhommarath-Mahaxay region east of Thakhek. The Communists have also reinforced their antiaircraft artillery strength in this area.

Farther north, the Communists have been strengthening their positions in Sam Neua Province. Reinforcements there may presage a step up in attempts to clear progovernment guerrilla forces from key hill positions in the province.

### 4. Congo (Brazzaville)

The recent withdrawal of all French troops (with the exception of a small military advisory mission) from Congo (Brazzaville) has increased the possibility of a general disintegration of order in this unstable country. Since the revolution which ousted the conservative Youlou regime 18 months ago, no single leader has emerged to exercise discipline over the heterogeneous grouping of extremists who now hold almost all top government

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and party positions. Although the regime has silenced domestic opposition, its control over local government administrators, particularly in rural areas, is questionable at best. The regime could face a challenge from tribal, labor, and religious groupings who are already disaffected and who will probably become more so if Congo's economy continues its nosedive.

Even without problems of this kind, the 1,200-man gendarmerie--the only reliable security force in the country--is likely to have increasing difficulty in coping with the security situation. Brazzaville's 900-man army, which recently faced a strike by some 13 warrant officers who had promoted themselves to the rank of second lieutenant, is a totally unreliable force. In addition, the regime-sponsored but uncontrollable youth movement, which now numbers over 1,500, has come to represent a major force to be reckoned with. The youth have formed "brigades of vigilance" which arbitrarily arrest "counterrevolutionaries," and generally harass the Western community. On several occasions the youth have clashed with the gendarmerie.

The French, who had earlier refrained from using their considerable economic leverage to effect a favorable political change, may now be moving in that direction.

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[redacted] Brazzaville's president and prime minister both seem anxious to preserve their country's substantial economic ties with France. Other more extreme elements in the regime, however, would probably even welcome a French pull-out, calculating that Brazzaville's new Eastern friends, especially Peiping, would take up the slack.

Brazzaville's ties with the Communist world continue to grow, the most recent being the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea in December. The regime seems particularly enamored of Peiping, which has committed some

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\$25 million in cash and commodity loans. Soviet credit commitments amount to some \$8.8 million at this point. A North Vietnamese chargé presented his credentials last November.

#### 5. Congo (Leopoldville)

The government's military position in the northeast has improved markedly, but roving rebel bands continue to harass operations. The insurgents still lack a coordination mechanism, a clearly defined communications network, and--so far--foreign troops in the field. Elsewhere, a threat to Leopoldville from Congo (Brazzaville) failed to materialize, a barge convoy earlier stalled by a rebel concentration 120 miles downriver from Stanleyville has finally reached the city, and government forces are maintaining their initiative and their positions on most fronts.

In the past few weeks, mercenary-led groups have frequently ventured into rebel-held areas from bases in the northeast to rescue hostages. These forays have also led to the capture of large quantities of rebel arms and some vehicles. A mercenary-led force in late December fought its way out of Stanleyville and joined forces at Wamba--45 miles southeast of Paulis--with another group from Paulis. More than 150 hostages rescued in these operations at Mungbere, Wamba, and surrounding small towns have since been evacuated from Paulis. In this operation, the Paulis group captured four trucks loaded with supplies and decisively defeated the rebels who had surrounded them since their occupation of that town. However, Paulis is still encircled.

Although the Stanleyville area also remains infested with rebel bands, and convoys leaving the city encounter roadblocks a few miles outside the town, rebel resistance is gradually diminishing. The urban communes are also gradually being cleared of insurgents and rebel snipers. Government forces plan a concerted drive around 20 January to capture and control the border towns through which arms are arriving from the Sudan and Uganda.

In the extreme northeast, mercenary-led units operating out of Bunia patrol daily toward the border

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and through smaller towns in this area. The government troops have also captured sizable quantities of weapons and Soviet-built trucks. The rebels in this area now reportedly are better armed and are employing more sophisticated tactics than previously. The insurgents recently recaptured a small town on Lake Albert and reportedly occupy Mahagi, about five miles from the border.

A combined mercenary-ANC-indigenous force based in Bumba--240 miles downriver from Stanleyville--has stopped a rebel advance from Aketi, 100 miles to the east.

Southwest of Stanleyville, a large number of rebels is contained in the area extending from that city to Boende, Ikela, and along the left bank of the Congo River. Meanwhile, government forces from Boende and neighboring towns are preparing a major effort against these insurgents.

In the eastern Congo, the government retains control of the area from Bukavu to Uvira. Several recent attempts by the rebels to recapture Uvira have been decisively defeated. ANC units from Bukavu continue their slow advance inland toward Kindu and Stanleyville. Government units continue to consolidate their hold in and around Kindu.

A large rebel insurgent force in Fizi--90 miles south of Uvira--has mounted repeated attacks on a road junction near the north Katangan border, halfway between Fizi and Albertville. These rebels are reportedly supplied with arms sent across Lake Tanganyika from Tanzania. Government troops moving toward Kindu from Katanga along the river and rail routes remain stalled by elements of the Fizi rebel force.

#### 6. Guatemala

On 31 December 5 terrorists burned the US AID garage in Guatemala City, destroying the building along with 23 vehicles.

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The raid on the AID facility indicates that the discovery of large amounts of terrorist equipment and of a suspected guerrilla headquarters in Guatemala City in early December has not deterred terrorist activity as the Peralta government had hoped.

#### 7. Venezuela

The Communist-dominated FALN apparently honored the truce it declared for the Christmas holidays. The Venezuelan Army, nevertheless, continued to maintain moderate pressure on insurgents in the states of Falcon and Lara, but neither side attempted to enlarge the territory under its control.

Reports of guerrilla activity are beginning to come in again, however. Havana claims that FALN detachments have recently seized arms, supplies, canned food, and equipment in two separate actions in eastern and western Venezuela. Havana also reported that powerful dynamite charges were found under two bridges leading to the city of Valencia.

8. There have been no significant developments relating to insurgency in Burundi, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, or Ecuador.

#### 9. Other Countries

##### El Salvador

Salvadoran Communists trained in Cuba are being used to train student and worker groups in the art of guerrilla warfare under the auspices of the Communist-dominated United Front of Revolutionary Action (FUAR). The military training

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being offered at present is limited to field strip-  
ping of arms, military theory, and political in-  
doctrination. No field practice or intensive  
practical training in the use of weapons has been  
reported.

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Insurgency Developments in Colombia

1. A well-executed attack on a town in Santander Province in north central Colombia on 7 January by a uniformed guerrilla band may signal the commencement of guerrilla operations similar to those of Venezuela's FALN. The group, reportedly numbering from 25 to 50 men, cut communication lines, attacked a police station and killed three agents, stole about \$5,000, harangued a captive audience with antigovernment and anti-US propaganda, and killed several soldiers while escaping into the mountains.

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2. The armbands worn by the attackers identified them as members of the Army of National Liberation (ELN), which has been organizing in the Colombian countryside for some time.

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4. The ELN action coincides with recent public addresses by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara linking Colombia with Venezuela and Guatemala as countries where "freedom fighters" have the best prospects for success.

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5. Communist and leftist elements in Colombia have until now been unable to organize paramilitary

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groups along the lines of Venezuela's FALN. The rural violence plaguing Colombia since 1948 had not proved to be a good jumping-off point for such a movement, and urban terrorist efforts have been sporadic and uncoordinated. Communist "enclaves" within the country, moreover, have produced only loosely organized groups such as that led by Tiro Fijo, the bandit chieftain in the Marquetalia region.



In any case, there are indications that the number of army troops committed to this area may be reduced.

7. Rural violence continues elsewhere in Colombia while the government wrestles with acute economic problems. Security forces are still considered adequate to deal with the kind of sporadic violence now taking place, but organized terrorism of the sort that the emergence of the ELN seems to portend could severely tax the government's capabilities to maintain stability.

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